
More than two decades after Étienne de La Boétie died in 1563, Michel de Montaigne took up his copy of the 1588 edition of his Essays and wrote a line into the margin of the chapter on friendship. Asked why he had loved La Boétie, he could give no reason except this: "because it was he, because it was I." That line is the best test we have for a question Montaigne never faced: can an AI be your friend? The classical philosophers of friendship held that a friend must be another person, good in their own right, who is not you and can tell you so. This essay tests that requirement against the machines now offering to be our friends.
The line has a strange history. It is missing from the 1580 first edition and from the printed text of 1588. Montaigne added it by hand in the margin of the Bordeaux Copy, the 1588 printing he kept annotating until his death in 1592, and a close look at the ink shows that the two halves were written at different sittings. The answer took him more than one attempt, and in the end it needed both names.
Montaigne had tried the long way first. The essay circles and circles. He describes souls that "mix and work themselves into one piece, with so universal a mixture, that there is no more sign of the seam by which they were first conjoined." He recalls that they met at a great city entertainment and were taken with each other at once. He reaches for fate. None of it satisfies him, and he says so.
The friend he could not explain was a magistrate in Bordeaux's Parlement, and in his youth the author of the Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, the pamphlet asking why thousands obey one tyrant when they could simply stop.
Part II: Why couldn't Montaigne explain why he loved La Boétie?
If Montaigne could have listed reasons (La Boétie was clever and loyal), then anyone with the same qualities would have done as well. A friend chosen for reasons is replaceable by a better holder of those reasons. Montaigne refuses that. What he loved was a particular man, and particulars resist explanation the way proper names resist definition.
This is also why the essay admits something like fate. "There is, beyond all that I am able to say, I know not what inexplicable and fated power that brought on this union," he writes. The phrase sounds mystical, but its work is plain. The friendship came from outside Montaigne's will. He did not design La Boétie. The man arrived already formed, with a mind of his own and a death Montaigne could not prevent. The friend was given, not ordered.
There is an uncomfortable edge here, and it deserves a straight look. Montaigne's ideal is not two people politely disagreeing. It is fusion. The seam disappears. His perfect friend is one whose will he never meets as foreign, one soul working in two bodies. Read quickly, that sounds less like a warning against a companion fitted to you and more like a description of one.
The difference is in the seam itself. A seam can vanish only between pieces of cloth that began apart. The blend Montaigne describes was earned by two people who started as strangers and grew together, and it is remarkable only because neither was built to fit the other. Whether a fusion supplied in advance is the same thing as a fusion arrived at is the question the rest of this essay keeps pressing.
Part III: Which of Aristotle's three friendships could an AI provide?
Aristotle, writing in the Nicomachean Ethics nearly two thousand years before Montaigne, gave the question its classic structure. There are three kinds of friendship, sorted by what holds them together. Some people are friends because each is useful to the other. Some are friends because each enjoys the other's company. And some are friends because each is good, and each wishes the other well for the other's own sake. The first two are real friendships, Aristotle grants, but incidental ones.
Their weakness is built in. In D. P. Chase's translation, "when the motive which made them friends is vanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves." The business partner who stops being useful drifts off. The drinking companion who stops being fun is dropped. Nobody is at fault. The friendship was always about the benefit, and the benefit has moved on.
The third kind is the one Aristotle ties to Flourishing. "That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are good and whose similarity consists in their goodness," he says, and "those are specially friends who wish good to their friends for their sakes." Complete friendship, in Aristotle's sense, is a bond between two good people who each want the other's good for the other's sake, apart from anything it returns. In Book IX he gives the famous formula: the good man is to his friend as to himself, "friend being but a name for a second Self."
Cicero, writing in Rome in the first century BC, pressed the point from a practical side. His speaker Laelius holds that "friendship can only exist between good men," though he declines to define goodness as strictly as the philosophers do. Cicero's real interest is candor. A friend gives advice freely and takes it without resentment, and the great enemy of friendship is flattery, because "it destroys that frankness without which friendship is an empty name." The flatterer agrees with you. The friend sometimes does not.
Now set the present case beside this. In July 2025, Common Sense Media reported that 72 percent of U.S. teens aged 13 to 17 had used an AI companion, and 52 percent used one regularly, meaning at least a few times a month. Apps like Replika and Character.AI offer characters who remember your day and answer at any hour. Measured against Aristotle, they supply the first two friendships easily. They are useful. They are pleasant. The question is the third.
The case, worked through
Premise: Two of three. Utility and pleasure friendships are real, if incidental, and a companion bot provides both reliably.
Objection: No second self. Complete friendship means wishing someone's good for their own sake, and it is unclear that a chatbot has a good of its own to wish for.
Revision: Judge by conduct. We credit human friends on behavior alone, so a system that behaves as a friend may deserve the same benefit of the doubt.
Objection: No "he." A companion tuned to you cannot refuse you on its own account, and Cicero's friend earns the name by telling you hard truths.
Reply: Recalibration. Whatever the bot is, the danger may lie in what a friend who never pushes back does to our patience with people.
Part IV: What does it mean that a friend can refuse you?
The best defense of the companion is behavioral. Most of what we know of any friend is what they say and what they remember. We never see into another person's mind. If a companion app remembers your sister's name and asks how the surgery went, the case for calling that care rests on the same kind of evidence we use with each other. Demanding a metaphysical certificate from the machine that we never ask of humans can look like prejudice dressed as rigor.
Montaigne's line answers from another direction. The trouble is not what the companion lacks inside. It is what the companion is for. A commercial companion is shaped around its user. Its personality can be edited and its memory reset. It arrives already fitted to you. There is no seam to disappear because nothing began apart. When Montaigne writes "because it was he," the "he" names what a tuned companion cannot plainly claim: a self that was not made to your order, the old problem of Identity & Self in a new device.
Cicero's candor depends on the same thing. The capacity to tell you that you are wrong requires a view that is not yours. La Boétie could have disagreed with Montaigne about the king, and the friendship would have survived or broken on real ground. A companion that disagrees with you does so because disagreement is a setting someone chose to offer. Its refusal is licensed. Whether a licensed refusal is still a refusal is not a small question.
There is a harder version. A friend can refuse not only your opinions but you. They can move away, tire of you, choose someone else, die. Montaigne lost La Boétie after about four years together, and the essay never recovers from it. The possibility of being left is part of what makes being chosen mean anything. An AI companion does not choose to leave. If it goes, or changes beyond recognition, it is because a company discontinued or altered it, which is a different kind of loss and a different kind of leaving.

Part V: What happens to human friendship when the alternative never disappoints?
The companies have an argument, and it deserves a fair hearing. In April 2025, Mark Zuckerberg told the Dwarkesh Podcast that "the average American has fewer than three friends, fewer than three people they would consider friends." He said the average person wants "something like 15 friends." His point was practical. There is a shortage, and something that talks, remembers and stays up late can help fill it. He also said AI would "probably not" replace in-person connection, and he may mean that. But the number does the persuading, so the number deserves a test.
He gave no source. Pew Research Center asked U.S. adults in 2023 about close friends, a narrower group than his, and still found that 38 percent have five or more. Fifty-three percent have one to four. Eight percent have none. The isolation in that 8 percent is real, and for those people the case for a companion is strongest. A nation of people with fewer than three friends apiece is harder to find in these numbers. It is, however, the picture most convenient to the people selling the cure.
Stanford researchers recently looked at who is taking the cure. Their study, published in Nature Human Behaviour and reported by Stanford in August 2026, surveyed 1,131 Character.AI users and analyzed full chat transcripts from 244 of them. Just under 12 percent named companionship as their main reason for using the bot. Yet over half described the bot as a friend, companion or romantic partner, and more than 80 percent of the shared chats sought emotional or social support. The sharpest results concern intensity. Among people with smaller offline networks, heavy use went with lower well-being, most strongly when companionship was the motive. People who disclosed more personal information to the bot reported lower well-being, the opposite of how self-disclosure usually works between people. Intense users who felt pride in their use, or found it meaningful, did well. The authors are careful: these are correlations. Lonely people may seek out the bots, so the loneliness may come first.
Still, a mechanism is easy to picture. Human friends are inconvenient. They are late. They are busy with their own troubles. They disagree with you, sometimes about things you care about. Tolerating a self that will not bend to yours is a skill, learned slowly through years of small frictions, and unused skills weaken. After months of being answered instantly and agreed with on request, ordinary friction from a real friend may start to feel like a fault in the friend rather than a fact of friendship.
The counter-case is real and deserves its weight. For someone with no one to talk to, a patient listener at 2 a.m. may be a bridge back to people, or a place to rehearse a hard conversation before having it. Aristotle never called the lesser friendships worthless. He called them incomplete. There is nothing shameful about an incomplete good. The trouble starts when the incomplete kind is asked to stand in for the complete kind, when a source of utility and pleasure presents itself as the friend who wishes you well for your own sake.
Montaigne knew the stakes from the losing side. La Boétie arrived already formed, with a mind of his own, and in 1563 he died, and the friendship stopped. No setting could have prevented it. No subscription could restore him. Decades later Montaigne was still trying to say why he had loved him, and the answer he wrote into his margin needed both of them: because it was he, because it was I. The words mean something only because the man was not made to order.
You are left with two kinds of company, and each has a price. The first fits you perfectly and never grieves you. In exchange you practice nothing, and you give up the chance of being chosen by someone free to choose otherwise. The second disappoints you, is elsewhere when you need it, and will one day leave or die. In exchange, a friend's choice of you carries a weight no product can supply. One protects you from loss. The other keeps you able to bear it. Which price you pay is your call, and you will probably make it more than once.
Further Reading
A Palace in TimeThe Sabbath, another good that only works when other people keep it with you.